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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE 
STJ\TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 15573 
-vs-
STEVEN J. LAURSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with t\o.ro counts of automobile 
homicide, a felony of the third degree, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1) (Supp. 1977). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both 
counts, and the Honorable J. Robert Bullock sentenced the 
defendant to a term of not less than five years in the Utah 
State Prison on both counts; the terms are to run concurrently. 
RELlER SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirm-
ing the judgment rendered below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 27, 1977, the defendant caused the death 
of Ronald Beck and Michael Hansen by driving a truck into 
their motorcycle (T.6,25). The defendant and Robert Greenwood, 
a passenger in defendant's truck, left the scene of the 
accident (T.lO). The defendant was taken to his parent's 
home by David Jones (T.lO). Later that evening, the defen-
dant went to a hospital in American Fork to be treated for 
his injuries, and took a blood/alcohol test at that 
time at police request (T.35-37). The defendant's blood 
contained 0.15% alcohol (T.73). 
The defendant admitted that he had been the driver 
of the vehicle that struck and killed the two victims(T.38). 
The single important factural issue at trial was whether 
defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. 
The record on appeal contains only a partial trans-
cript of the trial and omits the testimony of Officer Gary N. 
Johnson, Richard Blomquist (the driver of the vehicle that 
defendant was attempting to pass at the time the accident 
occurred) and Margaret Morrell (the nurse that drew defendant's 
blood for testing) (R.33-37). The jury apparently felt that 
Mr. Blomquist's testimony as to the defendant's driving pat-
tern was important on the question of guilt (R.42). 
-2-
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The available transcript reveals the following 
evidence on the issue of intoxication: Robert Greenwood 
testified that the defendant had been drinking the day of 
the accident from a keg containing one to two gallons of 
bear (T.3-4). The defendant did not drink anything after 
the accident while being driven home (T.l3,18). Officer Bob 
Greenhalgh testified that the defendant was given a blood 
alcohol test at 11:30 p.m. and that the accident had occurred 
at approximately 9:15p.m. (T.35-38). The officer also took 
the defendant's statement that he had been drinking beer 
prior to the accident, that he had taken his last drink at 
about 7:00p.m., that he had nothing to drink after the 
accident, and that he could remember nothing that happened 
after the accident (T.38). Officer Jay Schoonover stated 
that his opinion was that the defendant was intoxicated at 
the time of his arrest (T.58). Dr. Albert Swenson testified 
that the defendant's blood contained 0.15% alcohol (T.73). 
This percentage is equal to the amount of alcohol in eight 
twelve ounce cans of beer (T.76). The witness testified 
that if the defendant had taken his last drink at 7:00p.m., 
his blood/alcohol level at the time of the accident would 
have been about 0.19% (T.78). The witness also testified, 
on cross-examination, that if the defendant had taken his 
last drink after the time of the accident, his blood/alcohol 
-3-
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level at 11:30 p.m. would be irrelevant to his blood/ 
alcohol level at the time of the accident (T.79). The 
defendant made timely objection to the introduction of the 
blood/alcohol test results on the ground that an insufficient 
foundation had been laid, because there was no showing that 
defendant had not drunk alcohol after the accident (T.54-56). 
The court overruled the objection but did not instruct the 
jury that there was any presumption as to the time of the 
defendant's last drink (T.56-57). The record reveals no 
objection to any instruction given the jury, nor does the 
record reveal an objection to the court sentencing the defen-
dant on both counts of the information. 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
THE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD/ALCOHOL LEVEL. 
The results of a test to determine blood/alcohol 
content is admissible in an automobile homicide action when 
it is material to prove that a person was driving under the 
influence of of alcohol, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) (Supp. 
1977). Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (Supp. 1977) provides: 
"If the chemical test was not 
taken within one hour after the alleged 
incident, the evidence of the amount 
of alcohol in the person's blood as 
shown by the chemical test is admissible 
if expert testimony establishes 1ts 
probative value .. 
-4-
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In this case, expert testimony did establish the probative 
value of the blood test, because the expert testified that 
he could calculate the defendant's blood/alcohol level at 
the time of the accident from the test results if the 
defendant took his last drink before the accident. This 
evidence was relevant, probative and properly admitted 
because other evidence raised a jury question as to the 
defendant's intoxication at the time of the accident. In 
this case, the jury heard evidence of the defendant's driv-
ing pattern, defendant's drinking during the day of the 
accident, and defendant's somewhat contradictory statement 
that he had nothing to drink after the accident and that he 
remembered nothing that happened after the accident. There 
was also evidence that defendant left the scene of the 
accident and was belligerent at the time of his arrest. This 
evidence raises a jury question of intoxication at the time 
of the accident, and made evidence of the blood/alcohol test 
relevant and admissible. 
The courts of several jurisdictions have dealt with 
this issue and have resolved it adversely to the defendant. 
In State v. Betts, 214 Kan. 271, 519 P.2d 655 (1974), the court 
held that evidence of a defendant's intoxication almost three 
hours after an accident was admissible where there was evidence 
-5-
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of an erratic driving pattern at the time of the accident, 
evidence that the defendant left the scene of the crime, 
and evidence that defendant was belligerent at the time of 
his arrest. The case of State v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 352 
(Minn 1973) presents a striking parallel to the present case. 
In Hansen, there was a three hour interval between the accident 
and the test that showed defendant had a blood/alcohol level 
of 0.11%. The defendant challenged the admission of the test 
results into evidence because 
" •.. the prosecution failed to 
show the defendant had not consumed 
any alcoholic beverage in the three 
hour interval between the driving 
conduct resulting in death and the 
extraction of the blood sample." 
Hansen at 355. 
The court concluded 
" ... that the circumstances, 
including flight, justify the in-
ference that defendant had not 
consumed alcohol during the three 
hour period." Id. 
The court came to the conclusion even though the 
I 
"eyewitness accounts as to 
defendant's condition as syptomatic 
of alcoholic intake at the time of 
the ... collision are ambiguous and 
conflicting." Id. at 354-355 
In the following cases, courts have rejected a defendant's 
contention that blood/alcohol test evidence is inadmissible 
unless the prosecution can demonstrate that the defendant 
-6-
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the last drink was taken after the accident. Defendant's 
counsel was free to argue, and the jury was free to find, 
that there was a reasonable doubt that the test reflected 
alcohol consumed prior to the accident. On the evidence out-
lined above, the jury did not make that finding. Respondent 
submits that the blood/alcohol evidence was properly admitted 
and defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT 
ON BOTH COUNTS OF THE INFORMATION. 
The record does not contain any indication that 
defendant objected to the trial court sentencing him on both 
counts. Respondent submits that this alleged error should 
not be heard for the first time on appeal. State v. Carter, 
27 Utah 2d 416, 497 P.2d 26 (1972). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1} {Supp 1977) does not 
bar sentencing on both counts because it applies only when 
the same act of the defendant is punishable in different 
ways under different provisions of the code. In this case, 
defendant's two different acts (ie. causing the death of 
Ronald Beck and causing the death of Michael Hansen) are 
punishable under the ~ provision of the criminal code. 
The cases cited by the defendant for the proposi-
tion that it is improper to sentence on both counts are 
-8-
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distinguishable. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the 
facts of Dawson v. State, 266 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1972) do not 
indicate that the defendant was charged with causing the 
death of two passengers riding in the same car. As the 
court citation to Stewart v. State, 184 So.2d 489 (Fla. 
App. 1966) makes clear, an anomaly in Florida criminal 
procedure allows a defendant to be found guilty on two 
counts of manslaughter even if only one victim is involved. 
In Virgil v. State, 563 P.2d 1349 (1977) the trial court 
imposed only one sentence, and the Wyoming Supreme Court 
affirmed, but noted: 
"There are many cases holding 
that killing by culpable negligence 
several human beings in one auto-
mobile accident constitutes as 
many separate offenses as there 
are victims and consecutive sen-
tences are proper." Virgil at 1352 
In State v. Little, 19 Utah 2d 53, 426 P.2d 4 (1967) this 
court held that it was improper to impose two sentences under 
two separate provisions of the criminal code for one act. 
This rule does not apply to this case for the reasons dis-
cussed above. People v. Duran, 515 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1973) 
dealt only with the imposition of consecutive .punishments, 
not concurrent sentences as were imposed in this case. The 
California rule, demonstrated in People v. McFarland, 26 
Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962), that two sentences can-
-9-
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not be imposed for a burglary and a larceny is clearly in 
conflict with the Utah rule State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 
363 P.2d 262 (1962). In Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 
169 (1958) the court did hold that a single shotgun blast 
wounding two federal officers constituted only a single 
offense. The persuasive value of Ladner is lessened by the 
fact that it dealt purely with an issue of congressional 
intent and not of constitutional law. "There is no con-
stitutional issue presented." Ladner at 173. Further, 
Ladner involved the imposition of consecutive sentence, a 
problem not present in this case. 
Respondent submits that causing two people to die 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
f 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
l 
I 
is more culpable than causing one to die, and that defendant's 
two concurrent sentences are fair and appropriate punishments. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the foregoing, respondent submits that 
defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSON 
Attorney General 
HICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
WILLIAH W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
-10-
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